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   The purpose of this article, theoretical in outlook, is to investigate the constitu-
ent elements or the basic conditions of man's religiosity. The main part of the article 
will be devoted to the discussion of T. Luckmann's  thesis on the subject as is found 
in his Invisible Religion. We will begin with the presentation of Luckmann's view, 
trying also to indicate some of the problems that are raised by his thesis. 
   Luckmann's ultimate purpose is the development of the sociologicaltheory of 
religion, whose lack of progress during several decades after Durkheim and M. 
Weber he deplores and criticizes in the first two chapters of his aforementioned 
book. Most research, he states, has been restricted to investigations in traditional 
and institutional religion, the underlying assumption being a tendency to equate 
institutional religion with religion tout court. Apart from his concern with the 
development of theory, Luckmann has argued that the growing marginality of 
traditional church religion not only  necessitates  •an  investigation into its causes, 
but also into the question whether any other froms of religion are replacing the 
institutional forms, in short, whether any new religion is in  makings). 
   Luckmann then proposes to  investigate the general anthropological conditions of 
religious phenomena: How are  individual  • human  beings capable of grasping meaning 
and how do subjective processes give rise to  symbolic universes of meaning, in other 
words, how are they objectivated and institutionalized?2) 
   The incipient as well as the centralpoint in the  establishment of meaning systems 
is the individuation of  'consciousness, which takes place in the socially ongoing for-
mation of Self.  The  two  complementary aspects in the formation of Self are detach-
ment from immediate experience and  the integration of the  'subjective processes of 
 recollection, and anticipation into a socially defined, morally relevant biography. 
Detachment, occuring  in and through  a  reflection on, or an interpretation of indivi-
dual conduct  by a  partner, is the presupposition for  the construction of a framework 
of interpretation and the establishment or objectivation of meaning. The integration 
of the subjective  processes of recollection and anticipation into a biography is attri-
buted to the continuity of social  relations.  It  contains  recollections and anticipations 
of other individuals. All  this  means that  objectivation  of meaning occurs  in a social 
context. Meaning is bestowed on subjective  processes in interpretative acts and located
 68 t± "A" n re 
in an interpretative scheme, the latter resulting from sedimented past experiences 
and ultimately in a system of meaning. Taken for granted are the human faculties 
of recollection and projection into the future as necessary conditions for the integra-
tion of individual biographies, as well as for the establishment of meaning systems. 
Luckmann repeatedly emphasizes that both biographies and systems of meaning ori-
ginate only in a socially activated process. What takes place here is fundamentally 
the same as we find in the process of institutionalization r the formation of societal 
structures, which is clearly described  elsewhere. Simply put, any human activity con-
stitutes an externalization f subjective or intersubjective experience. It is objectiva-
ted through its transmission to, and recognition by other people who internalize its 
significance. This may result in habitual, typified activity. A certain activity becomes 
institutionalized when not only action or roles are typified but also the actors them-
selves. 
   It is Luckmann's conclusion that, by socially forming and developing  a Self, in-
dividual human beings transcend their biological nature, because they would not be 
able to do so on the grounds of their individual biological recources only. It is this 
transcendence that Luckmann professes to be a universal and religious phenomenon 
from which spring the historically differentiated social forms of religion. 
   An elementary social form of religion is found in the configuration of meaning, 
which is also called a world view. This world view performs an essentially religious 
function for the individual who internalizes it, and by doing so, also transcends his 
biological  nature. The internalization of a world view is potentially the same as 
constructing a system of meaning from the beginning. The world view itself is reli-
giously elementary and non-specific. No single element of it is to be designated as 
religious. Its religious character stems from the hierarchical arrangement of meaning, 
or, the hierarchy of significance that it reveals. This hierarchy finds expression in 
specific, symbolic  representations,  referring explicitly to a distinct level of reality  
a level in which ultimate significance is located, and which can be called a sacred 
 cosmos. Consequently, he configuration  of religious representations that form a sacred 
 universe is to be defined as a specific historical form of  religions). 
    As may be seen from our summary so  far, Luckmann certainly discusses a very 
fundamental issue in the  sociology of religion, i. e. the anthropological ondition that 
makes religion possible. However, aserious problem  involved in this analysis is, wheth-
er the social formation of Self, the socialization process and also personal identity, 
as we will see presently — indeed representing  ,atranscendence of individual exist-
ence— has  religious meaning or not. It will be my contention in later sections that 
religion is concerned with the phenomenon f transcendence  but that not all transcen-
dence can be considered as having a religious character. 
    Luckmann's discussion also becomes  problematic in making an abrupt connec-
tion between the hierarchy of significance, containing  non-specific religious meaning,
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and a specific religious content, in other words, between a general and a specific 
social from of religion. Are all  specific, symbolic representations of the hierarchy of 
meaning religious? If they are, do all symbolic representations have the same religi-
ous value? 
   The same problem of general and specific religiosity is felt more keenly in 
Luckmann's discussion of individual religiosity. Consistent with the foregoing concep-
tion of the religious character arising in the internalization of a world view, the 
author defines identity itself as a universal form of individual religiosity. He conti-
nues that, if a society is religiously oriented  ••• if a sacred cosmos is internalized in 
a distinctly "religious" layer of individual consciousness, we may speak of a form of 
individual religiosity that is  more specific than personal identity as  such6). 
   But how do we know when and why a society is religiously oriented? If there 
were only a difference of degree between a general  and a social form of religion, 
the problem would probably less complex, but still difficult enough, e. g., when we 
would try to evaluate the differences in religious quality as may be found in the 
various religious traditions or even  within: one religious tradition, between its various 
religious activities. As such, the latter questions cannot be taken into consideration 
in this article, but since, in the last instance, they seem to concern the relation be-
tween the condition of religion and religion itself, I will mainly treat the problem in 
this connection. 
   Before engaging in my own discussion on, 1) the matter of transcendence and, 
2) the other conditions of religion I will review  and discuss some partial evaluations 
of Luckmann's work, namely those by M. Hill and R. Robertson. 
Evaluation and Criticism of  Luckman's Analysis 
   M. Hill, in his review of contemporary studies of religion, wants to trace their 
classic  roots'). In Luckmann's case a Durkheimian approach and emphasis is found 
throughout the discussion. More to the point, Luckmann's central theme is said to 
be the individual and the social order, a reinterpretation of that of the famous pre-
decessor, while Luckmann's important concept of objectivation is said to be a para-
phrasing of Durkheim's concept of collective representations.  Luckmann's view of 
religion would have been influenced by the same source. It is described as a reli-
gious outlook that lies as the very center of man's experience of his natural and so-
cial environment; it is the key  factor of endowing society with moral  authority8). 
    Tracing the relationship between contemporary research and classical theory is 
a valuable enterprise in the history of sociology but of less interest to theory itself 
and therefore to this article. However, I would like to make a few complementary 
and some contrary remarks. 
   Since Durkheim is one of the pioneers of sociology it is not surprising at all 
to find similar sociological  conceptions or parallels as to which themes are of central
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importance to sociology. The relationship of the individual and society is a good exam-
ple. It is an essential ingredient in all sociology, but it is not necessarily the focal 
point  in every discussion, as I think it is not in Luckmann's present book. Central 
here is "the religious existence" of the individual in society. It is this point that 
should be the object of evaluation. 
    Concerning the relationship between Luckmann and Durkheim, it seems to be 
more appropriate to treat it as a matter of historical and logical continuity rather 
than one of  strict influence as Hill seems to say by calling Luckmann a Durkheimi-
an sociologist, which is apt to cause misunderstanding about the former. Certainly 
not Durkheimian are Luckmann's tone and manner of  discussion, but proving this 
is rather onerous and  not  very rewarding. Easier to demonstrate is the absence of 
material evidence of  Durkheim's influence because Luckmann makes only two or 
three rather peripheral references to Durkheim's work. The main sources he avows 
are A. Schutz's existential  phenomenology, G. Mead's social psychology and C. Cood-
ley's theory of socialization as simply can be seen from the notes to the central chap-
ter III on the anthropological condition of religion. The less central references in 
the same chapter are references to Bergson, Husserl, Sartre and Halbwacks. Through-
out the book we find references to parallel discussions by P. Berger, who is also 
much influenced by the  phenomenological school. 
   A major difference between Durkheim and Luckmann's discussion of religion is 
related to their conception of the subject matter. Both scholars consider the  pheno-
menon of religion  to be a man-made reality, but quite in a different sense. Durk-
heim stretches his conception of religion as far as to include in it the sacred as a so-
cial category, which finds its origin and ultimate meaning in society. When we look 
at some details, we see  that.  Durkheim argues that the sacred  things are usually 
insignificant and by themselves unable to arouse such strong feelings as sacredness. 
Moreover, the central role in the primitive cult  is not played  by the totemic animal 
or plant, but by the totem or symbol, representing both  the spiritual  force and the 
clan itself. Durkheim therefore concludes that if there is only  one symbol for the 
clan god and the clan itself, it is because both are one and the same thing.  The god 
is the clan  personified9). Durkheim not only argues that society  has the moral power 
to arouse the sensation of the divine in the minds  of, people, he also generalizes 
about his view that if the ideas of the sacred, of  the, soul and gods are to be explained 
sociologically, it should  be presumed scientifically  that, in principle, the same explana-
tion is valid for all the peoples among whom the  same, ideas with the same essential 
characteristics are  found"). 
   Luckmann, on the other hand, may be reminiscent of Durkheim in  -his functio-
nal approach, e. g., attributing religious significance to  the hierarchical arrangement 
 of meaning in the world  view, but this  is not the case when he adds that its specific 
representations refer explicitly to a distinct level  of reality, as has been  stated  in our
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summary. In  Luckthann's  own words, The "reality" of the  world of every  life is  con-
crete,  unproblematic and,  as  we'  may.  say, "profane" ••• The domain  transcending= 
the  world of everyday life is experienced as  "different" and mysterious  ••• That  "real-, 
ity"  cannot be dealt with habitually, indeed, it is beyond the control of  -ordinary  men 
••• The quality that defines  the transcendent  domain is its  "sacredness"li). The lat-
ter expressions, as  alsd the frequent use of  the  term  "transcendence", seems to suggest 
that the sacred  cosmos is not to be reduced to a mere social category. Of course, 
Luckmann cannot affirm this explicitly,  since such an affirmation, as well as  its  ne 
gation, is inimical to an empirical discipline. He, therefore, brackets the terms pro-
fane, the sacred and the  like"). 
   One more point of difference in conception of religion is that  Durkheim,  in  con-
trast to Luckmann, conceives of religion as a reification rather than an objectivation, 
as a static reality rather than  a dynamic  or dialectical one. This follows, in general 
 froth Durkheim's view of social facts as "things", and in particular, from his view 
of religion as a reality "sui generis", in which he finds the roots of the fundamental 
categories of thought, magic and science. He concludes: "Consequently, summarizing 
we can say that all the important  institutions derive from religion. If religion is  the 
cause of everything that is essential in society, it is because the idea of  society is the 
soul of  religion"). This reality sui generis need not be a reification, but if everything 
essential in society is thought o derive from that reality, it cannot but be  consider-
ed as the undifferentiated  core of everything, which is not far removed from being 
 somekind of "thing" or other substance whose relationship to man is unclear. Also 
Luckmann could  say that the idea of society is the  soul of religion, but  'not that 
everything social derives from religion. In Luckmann's view, religion as well as society 
derive from the social  condition' of man, from externalized, objectivated  and further 
internalized  human activity. 
   A different discussion of Luckmann's view  of religion is found in R.  RobertsOn's 
 The Sociological Interpretation  of  Religion. As is stated in its  introdUction, Robert= 
 son is primarily concerned  with the theoretical  problems of religion at the macroso-
ciological level, especially with the relationship of religious orientations  and other 
orientations to the problem of  meaning. Central to the  whole treatise is the  substan-
tial definition of the religious  phenoinerion. It is  in  this  discussion that  Luckmann'S 
 definition is found to be too inclusive. If religion is  the  capacity  of  the human  orga-
nism  to transcend  its  biological nature through  the  formation of Self, personal iden-
tity etc., a religious  dimension  is  added to  everything:  huinan'4),  at least as a logical 
consequence.  Luckmann's approach indeed is  ‘a  totally  new look at the  old  question 
 of the definition  'of  religion's);  wick also  Concerns  us in this  article. 
   A fundamental distinction  is  made  betWeen functional and  substantial'  definitions 
of  religion"),In the  former,  the functions of the phenomenon are  used as criteria of
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identification. Functional definitions of religion tend to be nominal and inclusive, 
since different orientations and activities may fulfil the same functions and, from 
that point of view, can be classified under  a common heading. Thus, most inclusive 
is Luckmann's conception of the religious phere, originating in the capacity of the 
human organism to transcend its bioligical nature. Other functional definitions are 
those in which religion is defined in Parsonian terms of values or as the highest and 
most general level of culture. Possibly both substantial nd functional is the approach 
which defines religion as those beliefs and values that solve man's ultimate problems 
 (Tillich). 
   A substantial nd real definition, on the other hand, is a societal category, a 
proposition about the empirical world. Religion, or, in Robertson's terminology, re-
ligious culture is that set of beliefs and symbols (and values deriving directly therefrom) 
pertaining to a distinction between an empirical and a super-empirical transcendent 
reality, the affairs of the empirical being subordinated in significance to the  non-empi-
rical"). 
   Robertson purposely takes the option of a substantial definition mainly for meth-
odological reasons. First, he wants to deal with the relationships between religious 
and other orientations to the problem of meaning, as already mentioned. He also 
wants to exclude from the sphere of religion non-religious ystems of belief, the 
socalled surrogate religion such as the ideology of humanism, communism, nihilism 
and the like. Indeed, it is not logical to include into the category of religion 
ideological commitments hat are, or explicitly profess to be areligious or even anti-
religious. At the same time, it is not logical to separate totally ideological orientations 
of the mind, which have a similar function of contributing greatly to the identity 
of individuals. We will return to this problem shortly. 
   Second, Robertson's major reason for his subtantial option is his area of investi-
gation, which is the relationship between religion and society. Even a not too careful 
reading will easily reveal for example his repeatedly made distinction between the 
cultural and the social aspects of  religion18). Being concerned with religion as a fac-
tor of the social system evidently seems to necessitate a careful definition and de-
lineation of that factor. 
   Luckmann,in contrast, is concerned with what is religious in the individual's 
personality system. Religion here, is more function than factor. Although he takes a 
functional approach, he emphasizes that it is not very meaningful to begin with poin-
ting out psychological or even social functions of religion before one has showed 
how religion comes into being, how meaning is created, in other words, what the 
anthropological condition of religion is. Luckmann may be criticized for leaving the 
various aspects of religion undefined, also, for over-evaluating the anthropological 
condition of religion, calling a religious phenomenon what is only condition of, 
or capacity for becoming religious — this we will refer to later, but his use of a
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functional definition is most approgriate in relation to the general problem  of meaning 
and personal identity, as  I will try to show presently. 
   Identity, I think, can be strongly supported by any ideological orientation of the 
mind, religious or non-religious, because of internal and external reasons. Two in-
ternal reasons are related to man's specific biological and social nature. First, since 
children are born socially premature,  i. e., without an identity of their own, they evi-
dently have to develop one. This happens while they are standing in an internalizing 
relationship with the social environment, they cannot choose. Second, there is no 
 room for choice in the way of developing an identity. Its determinant is the sociali-
zation process which is universal. While the internalized content may differ, its ge-
neralized content is universal too: ways of thinking, acting and patterns of fellow-
ship. Pointing at the universal nature of  socialization and its universal forms is 
not a trivial remark, especially because the latter are the exclusive, general categories 
of activity or  externalization19), whose more or less satisfactory realization will leave 
the impression of the total fulfilment of human needs. 
   Because there is no choice neither concerning the content of an identity, nor 
concerning the way of arriving at it, it will be no exageration to say that the origi-
nal blueprint for an identity resembles the phenomenon of imprinting in the case of 
newly born animals, as was first observed and described by K. Lorentz. Although 
primary socialization  and the formation of an identity are actualized in a long pro-
cess, its virtually unconscious (not willed) functioning explains, I think, the strong 
relationship of its content to the evolving identity. 
    Further, there are also external reasonsfor that relationship: the plausibility struc-
ture of social knowledge and the hierarchy of significance that is contained in a 
world view and its domain of symbols. The latter has been interestingly pointed out 
by Luckmann. To quote: The authority of religious representations cannot be derived 
from the content of a given sacred theme taken in isolation. It rests upon the hierarchy 
of significance of the world view as a whole and, ultimately upon the transcendent 
quality of the  latter20). This probably is a consequence of the nomic or ordering 
 character of any socially constructed world, which constitutes a specific area of mea-
 ning at variance with or excluding many other  meanings21). This nomic character 
 is thought to be stronger still in the case of a symbolic universe, (a bodyof theore-
 tical  tradition), that integrates and legitimates not only individual biographies, but, 
 when there is only one available, also the institutional order as a  whole22). 
    It is, no doubt, this hierarchical arrangement of meaning that accounts for the 
 absolutist tendency of any religion or ideology, which also explains its legitimating 
 force. Let us consider a concrete example. In our societies there exists something 
 that could be called a modernistic, atheistic way of thinking, which asserts that re-
 ligion is nothing but a human projection and that men made their gods after their 
 own image, not vice-versa. Although this secularized way of thinking is often con-
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 sidered.  to be  the,  ,outcome of the decline of traditional religion in  4nn  industralizing 
society, it would be a mistake to  forget:  its.  coriiplex,.theoretical  background beginning 
with  the  gradual expansion of  reason-,  the  development  of the  science  'and the  'sub-
se4uent  philosophies:  NameS like  Gallileo,  Daiwin;'FeuerbaCh,  Niets-Che, Marx, Freud 
 and many  'other prophets of the  modern  time will  come  readily  to  mind. All this 
establishes the contemporary modernistic way of thinking as a respectable world  view, 
or as a belief in  its own  right, whose supporting function of personal identity will 
be stronger, the more numerous its expert legitimaters and its common social adhe-
rents  are23). This is  the first  external of ideology  and
,  identity. The second we 
find in the  hierarchy  of significance. As  a. kind  of  world view  . it is higher than, say, 
some mathematical  theorems,  the law of gravity,  and, certainly higher than the many 
imperatives of everyday life, Its  reason probably  _is the general applicability  of a 
 world  ,view as compared to  those  ,  other propositions about one part of reality  only: 
Again, its relationship to identity is thought o be strong because of the  unconscious 
functioning of the hierarchy of significance. 
   Concluding,  here, we can say  that the necessity of a  functional approach follows 
from the fact that in all those aspects of the relationship of  a  world view and  identi-
ty, we are not concerned with  its ideological content but merely with its functioning, 
which is thought  o  be  universal. Also,  because, of the above mentioned internal and 
external aspects of the relationship of ideology and identity, it becomes understanda-
ble that any ideology can become the functional equivalent of religion. However, 
having a similar function does not yet warrant he classification of an unspecified 
system  of meaning in the category of religion.  This we will try  to  demonstrate further 
below. 
   Concerning the matter of the  definition of religion, we can  say, I think, that a 
definition of the object under study  is part of the concerned conceptualization and 
of theory. It has to be  compatible with the purpose of the  study.. Another point is 
that both substantial nd functional definitions of religion, though used in a different 
context,  cannot' be opposed  to each other in such a way as to effect contradicting 
positions of any problem. Consequently, a definition which serves in both contexts, 
should be possible in principle. 
   Our remaining task concerning Luckmann's  theory of religion is to show, 1) 
that we certainly can find  one anthropological condition of religion in the capacity 
of the  individual  to transcend his biological nature in a social setting
, in other words, 
that religion has to  do with the aspect of transcendency, but  2) that not every 
transcendent  quality can be designated as religious. Actually, these are only two rela-
ated points in the same argumentation about  transcendence. Let us first turn our 
 attention to the question what transcendence is and where it can be found.
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 Tran8cenderice•  and  Religiosity — 
    According to  LuckMann,  tiariscendence  and  therefore  ligiosity, isfound in the 
 individualtion' f"consciousness,  the  creation  Of  meaning  and  the  fotination of  person-
 al identity. There  is  transeenderice  of individual biological  nature  beeause an  indi= 
 vidual would not be able, for instance, to create meaning depending on his own 
 logical  resources  alone. Concerning  thiS  Proposition I  would' like  to argue  that there 
 is a  quality of  ttanscendence butnot  of religiosity, because transcendence and crea-
 tion of meaning  can  be found in all  huinan activity or externalization that succeeds 
 in  objectivatiOn. Letus take some xamples. 
     The  making  of  an earthen vessel constitutes implicitly creation of meaning. We 
 can imagine that early man, prompted by the needs of daily life, made the discovery 
 by reflecting on  the different qualities  ofclay. By  making  some kind of container 
 out of mud, he gave a totally new meaning to that material nd to himself by enlarg-
  ing his own capacities and his  self-consciousneSs as well. Stronger  awareness of Self, 
 in our example, as  a potter, will be effected when this kind  of activity gains social 
 citizenship and when individuals are known as specialists in this craft. Growing  per-
  fection of skills will be accompanied by growing consciousness a  a successful man. 
 For our  putpose  here, it will not be necessary to belabor the circumstances, a  
  are the social context, he degree  ofcreativity or  routinization f the work, apprecia-
  tion of  fellowmen tc., that will be  'responsible for a certain degree of success. In 
  general, it can be said that there exists a strong possibility that role performance, 
  though partial  'in  nature24) greatly enhances a person's meaning, andconsequently 
  has  an' ego-supporting function. The same argumentation h lds for any other techno-
  logical activity  in its  'function of  enlarging capacities and consciousness, none of 
  which is  a  biologically given in the same way as the individuation f consciousness 
  is  not. 
     Another  example is that of  language"). Not much is known with certainty about 
  the origin of language, but the opinion seems to hold that it would not havearisen 
  without some fundamental conditions. One condition is man's ocial nature as in the 
  case of the creation of meaning. Another is man's  capacity of interpreting certain 
  selected  elements in a situation as signs  of something else, the realizationof which 
  supposes a combination f the capacity of expressing consciousness andthat of  refer-
  ring to  realities outside the subject. Concretely, language becomes objectified through 
  the construction f signs by  way of sounds or graphic representation. 
     Also language nables man to  transcend the immediately given  of  • individual 
  experience, to interpret  i ,to  analyse it  into components e c. Further, although there 
  is a tendency toconfine meaning within  'a certain extent through the complex mor-
  phology (concepts, grammar nd  syntax): ofa language,  words and phrases  cantake 
  on a great range of meaning according to the  intention of the user and the social 
  context. Because of all this, it is no exaggeration t   say that language is themost
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important means and material with which all culture, both personal and collective, is 
build up. This is the equivalent of saying that language, itself born from the inter-
action of subjects and objects, is the most important external means of intellectual 
growth, in other words, of transcending the biologically given of the individual or-
ganism. 
   A still different transcendence of biological nature can be found in the domain 
of human relations, as for example in the parental love relations. It is common know-
ledge in psychology26) that in order to become a normal person, a baby must be 
put at ease in his feeding, sleep and the relaxation of his bowels. This is necessary 
for physical as well as mental health. If a baby has the continued experience that 
his mother takes care of him when he is in need of her, he will learn to trust, and 
his first social achievement will be, as Erikson puts it, his willingness to let the 
mother out of sight without anxiety or rage. In the same context it is said that the 
absence of basic trust in the first period of one's life causes an unstable identity, 
or in other words, a neurotic or schizoid personality. From this it is more than clear 
that a trustworthy, i. e., a caring and loving person is a necessary condition for the 
healthy growth of a young person. 
   Further, it seems to be commonly taken for granted that care and love are bene-
ficial to any human being throughout all of his life cycles. E. Fromm, for example, 
has written that for modern man, who has become free from external bonds and who 
is free to act and think as he sees fit, positive freedom consists in the spontaneous 
activity of the total, integrated personality. This spontaneous activity is best realized 
by engaging oneself freely in society through work in which man becomes one with 
nature in the act of creation and through love, the foremost component of spontaneity, 
not love as the dissolution of another person, but love as spontaneous affirmation of 
others, as the union of the individual with others on the basis of the preservation of 
the individual self"). This means that human happiness, being closely connected to 
one's fellowmen and to nature, is something that must be "reached", transcending 
one's own individual recources, transcending one's innate egocentrism. 
   Summarizing, growth and transcendence can be found in the three main areas 
of externalization: thought, action and fellowship as is shown by our examples. Para-
phrasing Fromm, I would like to say that, because of man's social — and therefore 
always unfinished nature, growth and transcendence in one or more areas of exter-
nalization is essential to human happiness. Because growth only from within does 
not seem to be possible at all, positively, because an internalizing relationship with 
the outside, whether fellowmen, nature or culture, is a necessary condition for any 
growth, there will also be a cert  ain degree of transcendence of biological nature in 
any growth. Consequently, transcendence and growth must be one condition of re-
ligion, because religion without gain, without meaning, is nearly a contradictio in 
terminis. On the other hand, if any transcendence of biological nature is to be called
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a religious phenomenon, then most human activity would become religious, whether 
morally good, neutral or bad. The latter consequence would probably entail a still 
greater contradiction, but its discussion surpasses the scope of this article. We have 
to pursue the next point in the argument: how are religion and transcendence re-
lated? 
   We will begin with a few notes on the conceptual relationship of the two terms. 
That one of the meanings of the word "transcendence" is more or less antonymous 
with "immanence", no doubt, stems from the Judaeo-Christian belief in a transcenden-
tal God. As creator God is believed to be present to the world but not to be imma-
nent in it. He "transcendends" the empirical world but reveals Himself to man. 
Transcendency, then, is a qualification of the supernatural order, which means trans-
cendence per excellence. 
   Kant still uses the word transcendence in the sense of exceeding all experience, but 
he demonstrated systematically that positive knowledge about transcendent realities 
is impossible. He argued that reason shows a tendency to go beyond the field of ex-
perience, surpassing the world of the senses, but that it is not able to create positive 
knowledge concerning its inevitable problems: the freedom of the will, the immorta-
lity of the soul and the existence of God. He concluded: If  ••• these cardinal  propo-
sitions are of no use to us, so far as knowledge is concerned, and are yet strongly re-
commanded to us by our reason, their true value will probably be concerned with our 
practical interests  only28). 
   The impossibility of positive metaphysics should bring with it the devaluation 
of the term "transcendence". However, there have been other attempts, not unrelated 
to Kant, to reevaluate the term religiously through approaching the supernatural in 
a non-rational way. One such attempt was made by R. Otto,who envisioned the nu-
minous as an object of religious feelings. Otto argued that while the conceptual con-
tent of the supernatural is reduced to a negative one by reason, its emotional con-
tent on the contrary is eminently positive. In this connection he described the 
nature of the numen as is revealed in religious writings, songs, etc, which he 
summed up in his famous phrase: Mysterium tremendum et fascinosum, an awe-
inspiring and fascinating  mystery29). 
   Another use of the term transcendence, in the simple meaning of pointing be-
yond normal, everyday reality, is found in one book by P.  Berger30). The author, be-
lieving in the importance of religion, and in sympathy with theology, wanted to 
contribute to the recuperation of its lost strength in modern society. He, therefore, 
advocates an anthropolocally based theology, one that starts, not with the supernatural 
but with the situation of man. He states that many signals of transcendence can be 
found within the empirically given situation. Such signals are found in such disparate 
human attitudes and activities as are the following. There is the generally recognized 
need for order and trust in the goodness of being, much in the same sense as is
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mentioned above in connection with the first development in infants. Also, there is 
the orientation of human existence towards the future, namely, the attitude of hope 
especially in marginal situations, illustrated by the psychological difficulty of imagining 
one's own death or non-existence. Explained in the same sense also is the demand 
of absolute condemnation in the case of outrageously inhuman crimes against inno-
cent people as an unforgivable violation of the moral order. Lastly, there is the effect 
of play and humour, which either suspend the rules of the serious world or relativi-
zes them in laughter. All these are signals of transcendence, which contain an 
attempt to surpass the situation at hand. They point to a possibility of higher reli-
gious meaning, but still more, as Berger puts it, the expectation towards order and 
the attitude of hope, for instance, are most meaningful as religious belief. In other 
words, those expectations are only "really" meaningful if they have a fundament in 
reality, if there is life after death. 
    These notes about the term "transcendence" will be enough to illustrate that it 
is an eminently religious word. This, among other things, may have influenced Luck-
mann in qualifying as religious the transcendent aspect of the individuation of con-
sciousness. Now, then, the final question: what kind of transcendence is fully religi-
ous? Certainly, we are encountering a religious phenomenon when people say they 
are relating to a transcendent or super-empirical reality, as metioned in Robertson's 
definition. However, because we showed that religion cannot be concerned with all 
kinds of transcendence, and because there are religions, such as Zen Buddhism and 
others, that aim more directly  or exclusively at "human" transcendence, we have to 
decide what basic measure of growth must be realized in order to qualify for a truly 
religious character. To do that, we will rely on the conceptualization of two students 
of religion, P. Tillich and W. James. 
   Tillich has argued that religion cannot be reduced to just one function of man's 
spiritual life, as is done often. Religion would stop to be religion if it were reduced 
to either the moral function (the good) or to the cognitive function (knowledge). 
Neither can religion be reduced to the aesthetic function (the beautiful) nor to the 
domain of feelings only, because it would lose its seriousness and its truth. Tillich 
maintains that religion is the aspect of depth in the totality of the human spirit. Fur-
ther explained, this means that religion is the ultimate  concern  : the unconditional 
seriousness in moral demands and the passionate longing for ultimate meaning in know-
ledge. Aesthetically, religion is the infinite desire to express ultimate meaning. As an 
ultimate concern of such qualifications, religion gives us the experience of the Holy, 
of something which is untouchable, awe-inspiring, an ultimate meaning, the source of 
ultimate  courage31). 
   Tillich's view is important because he forcefully expresses the humanly transcen-
dent aspect of religion and also touches upon its mystery, the Holy. But where Tillich 
as a theologian envisions man's ultimate, spiritual ideal, W. James presents us
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with a phenomenological description, from which he draws some general conclusions 
concerning the essential elements of religion. In some detail, then, James, who was 
trained in psychology, wanted to study religious feelings and impulses, preferably the 
original experiences of religious virtuosi rather than the habit-like religious life of com-
mon believers. Like Robertson, later, he refuses to consider as religious merely moral 
or philosophical attitudes towards life that are characterized by rationality and resigna-
tion as e. g. in the case of the classical stoics. Religion, for James, always signifies 
a serious state of mind. He states: There must be something solemn, serious, and tend-
er about any attitude which we denominate religious. If glad, it must not grin or  snick-
er; if sad, it must not scream or curse. Concerning religious feeling James also says: 
It adds to life an enchantement which is not rationally or logically deducible from any-
thing  else— It is an absolute addition to the subject's range of life a new sphere of 
 power"). 
   After a thourough investigation of a wide variety of religious experiences, James 
concludes that the common nucleus of all religion consists of two parts: an uneasiness 
and its solution: 
 1/The uneasiness, reduced to its simple terms, is a sense that there is "something wrong 
about us" as we naturally stand. 
 2/  The solution is a sensethat "we are saved from the wrongness" by making proper 
connection with the higher  powers"). 
   We can further generalize these propositions, I think, and relate them to our 
earlier discussion of the double definition of religion. Religion in the strict sense 
implies: 
1/ An apprehension of the unfinished nature of man as an individual and social 
  being, together with the insight that something can be done about it, in other 
  words, that some progress or transcendence is possible. 
2/ A belief in a higher transcendency. Both "belief" and "higher transcendency", 
  here, mean that the goal or object of one's "insight" is not empirically given or not 
  strict verifiable, as is the case in what is understood as religious salvation and 
  enlightenment. 
A belief as described in the first point would be "functionally" religious, because 
of its ego-supporting aspect, which however, can also be found in non-religious ide-
als and ideologies. The added dimension in the second point makes it a "substant-
ially" religious faith. If the above is correct, then it is clear that there is no contra-
diction between a functional and a substantial definition. Also, this formulation shows 
the difference as well as the likeness of religion and ideology. 
Summary and Conclusion 
    Evidently, not all facets of Luckmann's theory of religion have been discussed, 
but I hope to have touched upon the main points of his analysis. As a positive eva-
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luation, I think that his present work on religion represents an important thrust to-
wards the advancement of sociological theory. As very valuable for theory as well as 
for religion itself, is his assertion that, before we analyse any psychological or social 
functions of the phenomenon, we have to investigate how religion comes into being, 
or, what its anthropological conditions are. The transcendence of biological nature 
in the individuation of consciousness and the construction of meaning is singled out 
as the most fundamental condition. Another very important aspect of religion or 
of any world view is its hierarchy of meaning, which, I think, is essential to the func-
tional understanding of any ideology and its connection with identity. 
   On the other hand, Luckmann's claim of religious (elementary and non-specific) 
status for the above mentioned transcendence and hierarchy of meaning is criticizable. 
Only transcendence and hierarchy seem to be implied, both of which are important 
elements of religion but not exclusively of religion. 
   Things would have been less complicated if Luckmann had clearly distinguished 
from the beginning between the several aspects of religion, its personal, institutional 
and cultural aspects, and also between religious and non-religious orientations of 
the mind. 
   Interesting as a question but somewhat premature in this stage of investigation 
seems to be the repeatedly mentioned or hinted at possibility of a new social form 
of religion characterized neither by diffusion of the sacred cosmos through the social 
structure nor by institutional  specialization34). The main reasons for its prematureness 
are 1/ that Luckmann fails to take into account the "substantial" qualification of 
religion, the specific religious transcendence as mentioned by James, 2/ that there 
are still other conditions of religion, which may be less sociological but which never-
theless should be discussed before theorizing about new forms of religion can be 
fruitful. This does not mean, of course, that partially religious attitudes would be 
impossible. They exist in many varieties and are religiously meaningful. 
   The other conditions of religion, which I would like to discuss in a follow-up, 
can be traced in the following relationships: 
1/ The connection of religion with nature, the physical world and its wonders that 
   have inspired many religious attitudes and continue to do so even today. This 
   could be termed the condition of religious ecology. 
2/ The connection with the potentialities of the human spirit and its affinity for 
   the religious dimension. There seems to be an aspect of "faith", to a certain 
   extent present in all belief, which differs much from rational understanding. It 
   is not immediately clear why some people have it and why others do not. This 
   could be called the psycho-religious condition. 
3/ The connection of religion and culture.  No religion exists in a cultural vacuum. 
   It is conditioned by cultural orientations, by thought, the artifacts of civilization
   and by history, all of which reveal some kind of transcendence. This cultural
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   connection could be termed also the socio-historical condition of religion. 
4/ Lastly, there is the connection with behavior. Religion which is not manifested 
   in behavior is probably only a partial religious attitude. Most significant here 
   seems to be symbolic, religious activity and moral behavior. 
All these are different dimensions and aspects of religion that have some universali-
ty. They are conditions or elements without which religion in the strict sense of 
the word is unthinkable. How these aspects relate to religion and to one another is, 
no doubt, a worthwile but large area of investigation in the sociology of religion 
and related fields of study. 
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